It’s a really good news, since there’s gonna be a new proseminar held in the summer semester. Its title is “What is at the Centre?” and in general it’s going to consider the issue of personal identity. The proseminar will be taught by mgr Mikołaj Sławkoski-Rode who is a PhD student in our Institute and spent last three years studying at the Oxford University (more about him may be found here)
>>> The USOS PAGE of the proseminar (REGISTRATION OPEN NOW!) <<<
>>> THURSDAY 9:45, ROOM 208 <<<
Description of the course: The course will be devoted to the philosophical problem of what can count as constituting the crucial subject matter when we conceive of ourselves as ourselves. The problem has two aspects: what can count as a Self, and what are the criteria for the preservation of the Self over time? These questions have historically been identified with the problem of personal identity, however in more recent discussions the relevance of personhood for continued identification of a Self has been doubted. Therefore the programme will be divided into two parts. The first part of the course will serve as an overview of how the problem of personal identity was conceived in the history of philosophy, with a special focus on Descartes, Locke and Hume. This part of the course will cover questions like: does personal identity depend on the continuity of memories, or are there other psychological criteria and conditions determining it? Or is it rather a matter of the continuity of the body? In the second part of the course the focus will be on the contemporary discussion, mainly within the analytic tradition, which attempts to solve problems with conceptions of identity inherited with the classical views. This part of the course will investigate questions like whether it is rational to care about in caring about one’s future existence or not. Students will examine Parfit’s view that what matters most to us is not identity but survival, and its consequences for modern conceptions of identity. We shall examine Schechtman’s view that what matters most for moral purposes is descriptive identity and not quantitative identity (the forensic account of identity). The origins of these conceptions will be illustrated with the speculative problem cases of teletransportation, bodily doubles, disembodied selves, etc.